Christopher Chilcott v. Procurator Fiscal, Stonehaven [2011] HCJAC 7

Criminal Appeal under section 174 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995:- The appellant was charged on a summary complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court in Stonehaven of driving a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of the speed limit on 9 May 2009 contrary to sections 88 and 89 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The charge is only triable summarily and no special time limit for bringing a prosecution under those provisions of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 is set by that Act and the general time limit for prosecuting statutory offences triable only summarily is specified as 6 months in section 136(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 which would expire on 9 November 2009 in respect of the present offence. The issue here, before 5 judges, was whether the prosecution brought against the appellant was duly commenced prior to the expiry of the 6 month time bar on 9 November 2009. Section 136(3) of the 1995 Act provides:- "(3) For the purposes of this section proceedings shall be deemed to be commenced on the date on which a warrant to apprehend or to cite the accused is granted, if the warrant is executed without undue delay". It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that since citation of the appellant to a diet had never been effected, no proceedings had been validly commenced against him and the prosecution was thus time-barred. It was further submitted that citation was essential to the proper commencement of a summary prosecution and there having been no citation the first calling of the complaint was void and all of the subsequent callings were similarly void. It was submitted on behalf of the Crown that citation was not an essential requirement for the purposes of the commencement of a summary prosecution and where a citation had been duly executed, the date of that execution constituted the commencement of the proceedings. It was further submitted that in the absence of an execution of citation, proceedings would commence when the accused attended, or was represented, at the first calling and pled in answer to the complaint. Here the court considered whether, on 3 November 2009 when the appellant answered the complaint and tendered his plea, that signaled the timeous commencement of proceedings.